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to assume this, yet after acquiring knowledge to the con-
trary he must exercise the care of an ordinary prudent
person. In Eastern Contractors, the truck driver testified
that he knew giant payscrapers crossed the intersection,
and that he heard one approaching as the decedent waved
him through but did not look. Perhaps a jury, even believ-
ing the testimony of the truck driver, might have found
that he had, or as a reasonably prudent driver should have,
"acquired knowledge to the contrary" in time to stop and
that as a reasonably prudent driver he would not have pro-
ceeded through the intersection.
While the majority and minority appear to be diametri-
cally opposed, and the minority objects to the seeming ex-
tension of the boulevard rule to the instant case, it is
doubtful if the applicability or non-applicability of the
boulevard rule fully explains the result and the dissent
therefrom. The divergence really seems to be one of inter-
pretation of the facts, and the extent to which the question
of how a reasonably prudent driver would have reacted
under all the circumstances. Perhaps under the boulevard
rule, or any other rule that does not impose absolute lia-
bility, the credence to be given to testimony and the ulti-
mate resolution of any disputed fact should be left to the
jury, under instructions which clearly and completely state
the law. However, the sharp division of the judges as to
the applicability of the boulevard rule to traffic light situ-
ations may suggest that where responsibility for injury is
so difficult to assess, a rule of comparative liability would
yield a fairer result and that legislative investigation of the
need for a rule of comparative negligence for appropriate
cases is called for.28
BERRYL A. SPEERT
The Admission Into Evidence Of Extra-Judicial
Confession Of Guilt Made By Third Parties
Brady v. State'
Brady and Boblit were each convicted of first degree
murder in separate trials for the killing of one Brooks in
the course of a robbery. At the trial of Boblit, the court
2See Comment, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed
Law Reform, 11 U. of Florida L. Rev. 135 (1958); Comment, Comparative
Negligence A Survey for Arkan8as Lawyer8, 10 Arkansas L. Rev. Bar Ass'n
Journal 54 (1956); Comment, Comparative Negligence, 51 Michigan L.
Rev. 465 (1953).
1226 Md. 422,174 A. 2d 167 (1961).
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excluded, because it was unsigned, a written statement of
Boblit in which he admitted to the strangling of Brooks.2
At Brady's trial, which preceded Boblit's, this statement
was neither made available to the defense nor offered in
evidence by the State. Brady, in an application for post-
conviction relief, contended that the unsigned statement of
Boblit would have corroborated his testimony that Boblit
did the actual killing and that the failure of the State to
produce the statement or to inform defense counsel of its
existence amounted to a denial of due process.' In an-
swering this contention, the State argued that the state-
ment of Boblit admitting the actual killing of Brooks would
have been inadmissible at the trial of Brady; thus its
failure to produce the statement could not have prejudiced
the rights of Brady. In reversing the trial court's denial of
post-conviction relief, the Court of Appeals held that the
State was under a duty to disclose the confession of Boblit
and that the statement could be used by Brady in support
of his defense.' To substantiate its decision, the Court
quoted from its opinion in Thomas v. State:
"[w]e hold that where a witness has made a written
confession that he committed the crime with which
the defendant is charged, the defendant should be
allowed to introduce the confession in evidence and
question him in regard to the confession and the cir-
cumstances under which he made it. We further hold
that where in a criminal case an officer has secured
contradictory confessions from two different persons,
the defense should be permitted to question him about
both confessions and we further hold that such a
confession by a third party is admissible unless it
appears that there was some collusion in obtaining
it.,,5
The Court reasoned that if Boblit had testified at the
trial of Brady, the defense could have cross-examined him
2 Boblit v. State, 220 Md. 454, 154 A. 2d 434 (1939). ,But see 2 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (12th ed. 1955) § 340, "A written confession is not
made inadmissible by the fact that It is not signed by the accused." See
also Carey v. State, 155 Md. 474, 142 A. 497 (1928) ; State v. Foulds,
127 N.J. 336, 23 A. 2d 895 (1941) ; 23 A.L.R. 2d 919 (1952) ; 2 JONES, THE
LAW Or EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1958) 742.
3 Since the murder was committed during the course tf a robbery,
Brady would be guilty of first degree murder no matter who did the
actual strangling, but, the defense hoped that the jury would find Brady
guilty of first degree murder without capital punishment if it believed
that Boblit did the killing. See Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 391, 76 A.
2d 729 (1950).
'The scope of this note is limited to the evidentiary point.
5186 Md. 446, 452, 47 A. 2d 43, 167 A.L.R. 390 (1946).
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about the confession. If Boblit had refused to testify, the
defense could have examined the police officer who had
taken Boblit's confession.
Boblit's confession was made out-of-court and while
he was not under oath. Brady contended that he should
have been able to use this confession as evidence of the
fact that Boblit did the actual strangling. If the confession
was offered for this purpose it was offered as evidence
of the truth of the matter contained in the statement and
was clearly hearsay. As such, the confession was inad-
missible unless it came within one of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule, and the exception for declarations against
interest is the only one available.
Declarations against interest generally are admitted in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because of
their reliability even though they are not made under
oath and the declarant is not subject to cross-examination.
Their reliability stems from the belief that a person would
not make a statement against his own interest unless he
believed it to be true. It should be noted however that it
is required that the declarant be unavailable to testify at
the time of the trial.6
The Sussex Peerage case,' in 1844, formulated the rule
that an extra-judicial statement, in order to constitute a
declaration against interest within the purview of that
exception to the hearsay rule, must be a statement against
a pecuniary or a proprietary interest; therefore an extra-judicial confession of guilt does not fall within this ex-
ception. In spite of severe criticism by treatise writers,8
the majority of United States courts have adhered to this
position.9 The proponents of excluding third party extrajudicial confessions reason that if such confessions were
to be admitted, the courts would be flooded with perjured
testimony offered to free the real criminal.10 It is believed
that third persons could make statements that would be
advantageous to the position of the accused, but at the
same time not adversely affect their own interest. For
example, in the case of Commonwealth v. Wakelin," the
6 McCoRMICx, EVIDENCE (1954) § 257 states that if for any reason
the declarant is unavailable to testify sit the trial, including his success-
ful claim of privilege, he should be considered unavailable for the pur-
poses of this exception. The cases are conflicting on this point.
11 C1. & F. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 [1844].
85 WIGMORE, EvmENcE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1476, 1477; MCCORMICK, Op.
cit. supra, n. 6, § 255.
9 WIGMORE, id., § 1476.
10 See e.g., Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 (1880).
" 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918). The confession was received in
this case because no objection was offered to it, probably because the
BRADY v. STATE
defendant offered into evidence the statement of one
Ducharme that he had committed the murder with which
the defendant was charged. This statement was offered
through a witness who testified that he was in a jail cell
with Ducharme when the statement was made. Ducharme
had since been executed at the state prison. In McCoslin
v. State,2 the defendant offered a declaration of one alleged
to be his accomplice, in which the accomplice stated that
he alone committed the crime with which the defendant
was charged. The declaration was not reliable because the
accomplice was liable to the same amount of punishment
whether he committed the crime alone or in conjunction
with the defendant.
In the case of Donnelly v. United States,13 decided in
1913, the Supreme Court followed the weight of authority
in the State courts and refused to admit the confession of
a third party that he had committed the murder with
which the defendant was charged, even though the third
party was deceased at the time of the trial. But in this
case, Justice Holmes, joined by two other Justices, wrote
a landmark dissent which opened the door for the admis-
sion of this type of evidence. In his dissent, Holmes urged
the Court to follow experience, common sense, and logic
rather than be hampered by history.14 He stated, in refer-
ence to declarations against penal interest, that "no other
statement is so much against interest as a confession of
murder . . . ."I Wigmore states that the majority rule is
a "barbarous doctrine" and he does not consider the danger
of perjured testimony to be a valid basis for it. 16 Neither
Wigmore nor Holmes would assert that there is absolutely
no danger of perjury if declarations against penal interest
were to be admitted as evidence. As can be seen from the
Wakelin case, it would be dangerous to admit all such
declarations; therefore it would be necessary for the courts
to adopt safeguards in order to minimize this danger. The
courts could require evidence of the circumstances sur-
rounding the declaration which would tend to show its
reliability. If the declaration in question is a confession
of the crime with which the defendant is charged, the
courts could require other evidence tending to implicate
prosecution had convincing evidence that the confessor could not have
committed the crime, and this evidence may have cast doubt on the
defense generally.
' 96 Tex. Cr. R. 175, 256 S.W. 294 (1923).
's228 U.S. 243 (1913).
1 Id., 277, 278.
Id., 278.
WIGMORE, Op. cit. 8upra, n. 8, § 1477.
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the declarant with the crime. The courts also could look
to see if there appears to be any collusion involved. This
would be a part of reaching an initial determination that
the statement was against interest.
Ten years after Donnelly, in the case of Hines v. Com-
monwealth7 the Virginia Court in following Holmes'
dissent, admitted evidence of a confession of homicide by
a third party who had the motive and opportunity to com-
mit the crime confessed. A number of courts, although
still a minority, have retreated from the Sussex Peerage18
decision. Some seem to reject the rule completely,19 while
others limit its application and find circumstances under
which extra-judicial confessions of guilt are admissible.2 0
Both the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence specifically state that a declaration that will
subject the declarant to criminal liability is a declaration
against interest within the purview of the exception to the
hearsay rule.21
The Maryland Court of Appeals, as attested by the
instant case, seems to be favoring the minority position of
those who reject the rule of exclusion completely. Origi-
nally, however, Maryland followed the strict doctrine
against the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions of
third parties. In Munshower v. State,22 the Court of Ap-
peals followed the reasoning and the rule of the majority
of the American courts, and in Baehr v. State,23 a bastardy
case, it held an extra-judicial admission by a third party
that he was the father of the child, to be inadmissible.
The exclusionary rule appeared to be firmly established in
Maryland, but in 1920 the Court paved the way for liberali-
zation of this strict doctrine. In another bastardy case,24
while expressly recognizing the majority rule of the
Baehr case, the Court held an extra-judicial admission of
paternity made by a third party not under oath to be
17136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 35 A.L.R. 431 (1923).
Supra, n. 7.
19 See Osbourne v. Purdom, 250 S.W. 2d 159, 163 (Mo. 1952) where the
court stated, "It is clear that, by making these declarations, Matt Jones
was subjecting himself to criminal liability.... .We, therefore, hold this
was sufficient to make his statements admissible as declarations against
interest."
20 See e.g., Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas, 10 Tex. L.
Rev. 399, 409 (1932).
"A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 509(1); UNIFORM RuLES
OF EVIDENCE (1953) Rule b3 (10).
= 55 Md. 11 (1880).
136 Md. 128, 110 A. 103 (1920).
2Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148, 48 A.L.R. 342 (1926).
BRADY v. STATE
admissible, reasoning that the special circumstances of the
case practically assured the reliability of the extra-judicial
confession and therefore justified making an exception to
the rule.2 5
In the above discussed Thomas26 case, the Court again
refused to overturn the rule of the Baehr case. Although
it stated rules to govern the admissibility of extra-judicial
admissions of guilt, the Court pointed out that the de-
clarants were before the Court, and the value of their
declarations depended on their reliability as witnesses.
The rules laid down in the Thomas case therefore were
merely dicta until they were specifically applied in the
principal case. To date the Maryland Court of Appeals
has not expressly overruled the majority position, but has
recognized the possibility of admitting this evidence if cer-
tain conditions tending to show reliability are met.
In adopting the minority position in circumstances
where reliability is supported by special circumstances,
Maryland is taking an enlightened and progressive view.
The reasoning of the majority position is difficult to de-
fend. As pointed out by Wigmore, there is a danger of
perjury whenever oral testimony is relied upon; 28 and, as
stated in the Thomas case, extra-judicial admissions of
guilt should be admissible into evidence only if they appear
to be free of collusion. Certainly the courts would care-
fully scrutinize all such declarations, and frivolous or
collusive declarations would be excluded. This was done
in the instant case, no collusion or bad faith having been
found.
Apparent reliability is not a requirement peculiar to
the admissibility of penal declarations against interest.
This requirement is imposed both on declarations of a
presently existing mental state29 and also on declarations
against pecuniary or proprietary interests.30 If this re-
quirement makes admissible the out-of-court declarations
15The accused claimed that the actual father of the child had committed
suicide and left a letter disclosing that he was responsible for the bastardy.
There was evidence to show that this letter was found on the body of
the suicidal victim. The suicide was committed on the day of the child's
birth and supposedly resulted from the victim's conviction that he was
the father of the child. Unlike the circumstances surrounding this
declaration, in the Baehr case there was little evidence that would tend
to show the reliability of the declarant's statement.
Supra, n. 5.
27Ibid.
WIoMORE, loc. cit. supra, n. 8.
MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra, n. 6, § 268.
O Id., § 256.
19631
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in these areas, it should impel a similar result in the area
under consideration.3 1
In admitting declarations against penal interest the
court might possibly be preserving for an innocent defend-
ant the only evidence available to assure his acquittal. It
is submitted that the admission of such statements, under
the safeguards set forth in the Brady case, will more often




Cooper-Merriken Fertilizers, Inc. v. Smith'
Mortgagee and mortgagor entered into a written agree-
ment for a public sale of the chattels covered by the mort-
gage. The property was to be sold by a third party in the
mortgagor's name and the proceeds held for the benefit of
the mortgagee. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the mort-
gagor, obtained summary judgment and subsequently levied
an attachment on the property. The mortgagee then peti-
tioned and was given leave to intervene in the proceedings
to protect its lien, which it claimed to be superior to any
claim of the judgment creditor. The Circuit Court for Kent
County, in a Memorandum Opinion, held that the mort-
gagee did not lose its lien since the third party auctioneer
was acting as a trustee for the mortgagee and not as agent
of the mortgagor.
There are three types of agreements entered into by
mortgagor and mortgagee in which the problem of the
principal case may arise. First, the mortgagee may uncon-
ditionally consent to the selling of the property by the
mortgagor in the mortgagor's name. It is undisputed that
in such a situation the mortgagee loses his lien, and an at-
"Declarations against penal interest have occasionally been admitted
in civil cases on the theory that the crime also subjected the declarant to
tort liability and was therefore against his pecuniary interest. See e.g.,
Weber v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.' Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) ;
Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284, 162 A.L.R. 437 (1945).
If this is a basis for admissibility in civil cases, the same should also
hold true in criminal cases. The reliability factor is the same, and the
necessity would be even greater since the life of the criminal defendant
could very possibly be dependent on the admission of this type of evi-
dence.
I Daily Record, November 17, 1962 (Md. 1962).
